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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appellant Mark Ciccarello, by and through his counsel of record Points Law, PLLC,
respectfully submits this reply to the Briefs filed by the respective Responden ts.
Appellant will not restate the facts and arguments contained in his Appellant' s Brief, but
will address the crux of the arguments asserted by Responden ts, in turn.
Appellant does posit for this Court, a crucial and overriding "oversight" not squarely
addressed in Responden ts' briefing; the District Court granted their motions for summary
judgment on an issue not raised in their briefing. Responden ts' attempts to avoid this issue
through briefing only draws attention to the obvious.
The record in this case is clear. In their second motions for summary judgment
Responden ts made one argument - Appellant can't claim a breach of duty, because Responden t
Davies did exactly what Appellant asked him to do; protect the assets of F.E.M. from forfeiture.
In ruling on Responden ts' motions, the District Court held "Mr. Davies may have been
acting negligently , though Mr. Ciccarello' s expert has to testify that Mr. Ciccarello would have
received better deal terms that would have had a better result for Mr. Ciccarello if Mr. Davies
had been acting non-negligently. Mr. Cicarello's expert has not offered such testimony, and so
Mr. Ciccarello' s claim fails." (emphasis added) R. Vol. 1, p. 764.
This "ruling" by the District Court speaks to the issues of causation and damages; i.e. the
expert has to testify that Mr. Ciccarello would have received better deal terms - or would not
have been damaged to the degree he was - had his attorney not been negligent. This argument
was not raised by Responden ts in their motions for summary judgment. As set forth below, the
ruling of the District Court should be reversed on this basis alone.
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1. The District Court abused its discretion in granting Respondents' Motions for

Summary Judgment based on its holding that Appellant had to have an expert
testify in response that motion, to establish the all of the prima facia elements of
his malpractice claim; even to elements not raised by Respondents.

The Respondents argued, and the District Court essentially held, that notwithstanding
what argument is asserted, or how a motion is couched by a defendant attorney in a motion for
summary judgment, and notwithstanding if there are genuine issues of material facts on which
that argument is premised , the plaintiff has the burden to provide an affidavit from an attorney,
addressing issues not raised by the defendant attorney, to withstand summary judgment. This
position is untenable.
In an attorney malpractice case, in response to a motion for summary judgmen t filed by a
defendant attorney, the plaintiff only has the burden to respond to those issues raised by the
defendant. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 838 P.2d 293. In addition, on a motion for
summary judgmen t on a prima facie case issue, the moving party has the burden of showing
the absence of any genuine issue of fact on any of the elements of that prima facia case issue.

Id. at 698,838 P.2d 301 (1992)(emphasis added). The non-moving has no burden to respond
with any evidence if the moving party does not establish the absence of any genuine issue of fact
on any one issue. Id. (emphasis added).

In Thomson v. Idaho Insurance Agency, Inc. , 126 Idaho 527, 887 P.2d 1034 (1994),
plaintiffs sued their insurance agent for not procuring requested insurance. In Thomson, the
district court in ruling on defendant' s motion for summary judgmen t, found that there were
disputed material fact issues regarding the elements of duty and breach, but also found that the
plaintiffs had not shown "sufficient material facts from which the court could find a genuine
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issue regarding the element of proximate causation." Id. at 530,887 P.2d 1037. Because the
defendant never raised the issue of proximate causation in its motion for summary judgment, this
Court reversed the decision of the district court. Id. See also Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho
672, 39 P.3d 612 (200l)(a district court may not decide on an issue not raised in the moving
party's motion for summary judgment, and the non-moving party is not required to respond to
issues not raised by the moving party even if the non-moving party ultimately has the burden of
proof at trial); See also Hodge v Waggoner, Supreme Court ofldaho, Docket No. 45336 (2018).
Specifically, this Court held in Thomson "that the party responding to a summary
judgment motion is not required to present evidence on every element of his or her case at that
time, but rather must establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the element or elements
challenged by the moving party' s motion." Id. , citing Farm Credit Bank ofSpokane v.

Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,273, 869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994)(ifth e movant does not challenge an
aspect of the nonmovan t's case in that party's motion, the nonmovant is not required to address it
at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings). 1
Precisely applicable to this case, this Court in Thomson held that "if the party moving
for summary judgment raises issues in his motion but then fails to provide any evidence
showing lack of any genuine issue of material fact with respect to those issues, the
nonmoving party has no burden to respond with supporting evidence." Id. (emphasis

added). "This Court has consistently held that when a party moves for summary judgment, the
initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with that
party." Id. , quoting Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (l 994)("The

1

In Thomson, which was a negligence case in which the defendant moved for summary judgment on the issues of
duty and breach, this Court clarified that the non-moving party has to " make a showing that disputed material facts
existed with respect to the elements of duty and breach, since these are the elements of negligence on which the
respondents moved." Id. at 531 , 887 P.2d at I 038 (emphasis added).
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burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving party)( other
citations omitted). "Thus it follows that if the moving party fails to challenge an element of the
non-movant's case, the initial burden placed on the moving party has not been met and therefore
does not shift to the non-movant." Id.
In this case, the Respondents' second motions for summary judgmen t were limited to
breach of duty and were based on a very concise argument: "Plaintiffs cannot show that Davies
failed to perform a duty undertake in the representation of Ciccarello. That is, as Ciccarello has
attested to in his own sworn declarations and deposition testimony, even if Davies represented
Ciccarello, Davies followed Ciccarello's explicit instructions with reasonable promptness and
care, implementing the plan that Ciccarello and others, in their own business judgmen t, had
devised and approved." R., Vol. I, p. 000510. "Because Davies violated no duty to Ciccarello,
Plaintiff s negligence claim must fail." Id.
In support of their motions, Respondents filed no affidavit of Respondent Davies or any
expert setting forth why the provisions in the subject documents drafted by Davies did not breach
a duty to Appellant, nor did Respondents even attempt to explain why the provisions of the
subject agreements were necessary to carry out this repeatedly referenced "plan" that Appellant
allegedly instructed Davies to carry out. In sum, the argument was - "he asked me to draft it, so
I did, therefore he can't claim I breached a duty."
What Respondents exclusively put forward in their respective second motions for
summary judgmen t were the facts on which the motions were premised; whether Respondent
Davies did everything Appellant asked him to do. The stated factual premise of the motion
actually seems preposterous given the record of the case. However, Respondents didn't attempt
to establish (nor can they establish) evidence that there is no issue of material fact regarding
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whether Respondent Davies did exactly what Appellant asked him to do. Respondents simply
selectively cited testimony from Appellant, claimed Respondent Davies did everything Appella
nt
asked him to do, and then argued in their reply, that the District Court should grant their motions
because Appellant needed to come forward with an expert affidavit to establish the element
s of
his prima facia case. 2
The position Respondents assert in briefing is that " [w]ithout first establishing a prima
facie case of legal malpractice, no dispute of fact of fact is material." Respondent's Brief
of Bo
Davies, p. 18 (no authority cited). In sum, Respondents' position is that it doesn' t matter
what
the factual basis of their motions were, or what specific element of Appella nt's prima facie
case
they challenged in their motions for summary judgment, Appellant had to respond to the
motions
with expert testimony supporting all the prima facie elements of the claim. Respondents'
ignore
controlling case law that is well established in this Court's opinions summarizing burden

shifting

under Rule 56, which will be addressed below.
Respondents' had the burden to establish that there is no issue of materia l fact that
Respondent Davies did everything Appellant wanted him to do, and only then could the District
Court find Respondents breached a duty to Appellant.
Appellant appropriately responded to Respondents' motions , citing numerous
declarations and deposition testimony to establish that no, in fact Respondent Davies didn't
do
everything Appellant asked him to do: Appellant didn' t ask him to give Lotus a mechanism
to
stop paying him the $2M purchase price for F.E.M., and Appellant was promised by Respond
ent

2

Respondents claim that they raised the "expert testimony " issue in their opening memoran
dum, referring to the
statement "Plaintiff has not proffered competent expert testimony estab lishing that Bo Davies
fai led to meet the
applicable standard of care when he provided documents to Plaintiff which he approved
, agreed to, and signed." R.,
Vol. I, p. 00060 1. This statement has no bearing on the fact that Respondents' " breach
of duty" argument is based
on a false and/or disputed factual premise; Respondent Davies did not "do exactly" what
Appellant asked him to do.
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Davies that his membership shares in Baus would transferred back to him. Summary judgmen t
should have been denied on this premise alone; disputed material facts as to Appellan t's
purported "instructions." Respondents never met their burden (and they could not have met their
burden) of establishing an absence of disputed material facts on this issue to allow the District
Court to evaluate those facts and make a determination as a matter of law whether Respondent
Davies breached a duty to Appellant.
Respondents and the District Court erroneously relied on this Court's recent opinion in
Greenfield v. Smith, 162 Idaho 246, 395 P.3d 1279, for the proposition that an expert affidavit is
always required in response to summary judgmen t unless the alleged malpractice is so obvious
that no expert testimony is required. This case is obviously factually distinguishable from
Greenfield.
In Greenfield, the Defendant attorney filed a motion for summary judgmen t, supported by
an expert affidavit who opined that the complained of actions of the defendant attorney did not
fall below the applicable standard of care or cause the plaintiff damage. From what can be
gleaned from the Greenfield opinion, there were no disputed material facts; only questions of law
remained over whether the alleged negligent acts of the defendant attorney fell below the
standard of care and caused the plaintiff damage.
In Greenfield, the plaintiff took the position that she could establish, through her own
testimony, that the defendant attorney breached the standard of care and caused her damage. This
Court, correctly held that " the moving party must make a sufficient showing to establish the
existence of an element essential to the parties case on which the party will bear the burden of
proof at trial." Id. at 398, 395 P.3d at 1282. That is, the plaintiff must show that that the
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defendant attorney' s actions did fall below the standard of care, and that this can only be
established through an expert.
Appellan t never took the position in the underlyin g case that he didn't have to prove his
case with expert testimony. In fact, at the time the decision on the subject motions was entered,
Appellant had in fact filed an initial expert witness disclosure, and a declaratio n of his expert
rebutting the Responde nts' expert witness disclosure.
If Responde nts had come forward in support of their motions with an affidavit from an
expert that claimed that the actions taken by Respondents, and complained of by Appellant
didn't fall below the applicable standard of care, as the defendant attorney did in Greenfield, then
Appellant certainly would have had an obligation to come forward with pleadings establishing
any issues of material fact, and also with an expert affidavit refuting the opinions proffered by
Respondents.
However, the only issue subject of the Responde nts' motions was the issue of breach of
duty, and the claim of "no breach of duty" was based on a very discrete factual premise (i.e.
Respondents did everything Appellan t asked).
Again, Responde nts put forth no expert affidavits and offered no explanation as to why or
how Responde nts' actions didn' t breach a duty to Appellan t- but only kept repeating that
Respondents just did what they were told by Appellant.
Because the express factual premise on which the argument of "no breach of duty" was
asserted, the motions should have been denied. Respondents' attempts to change the nature
and/or expand the scope of their motion based on Appellan t' s response and the District Court' s
opinion, is discernible.
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In addition, because the District Court granted Respondents' Motions for Summary
Judgment on the issue of causation damages, which issue were not raised by Respondents, this
Court should reverse the District Court's decision. 3
2. The District Court abused its discretion in granting Respondents' Second

Motions for Summary Judgment as Appellant established sufficient issues of
disputed material fact to defeat the motions.
In response to Respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment, Appellant articulated that
because the respective motions were based on a false factual premise, or at the very least a
premise that is chalk full of genuine issues of material fact, that the motions should have been
denied.
Put another way, Respondents could not maintain the position that Respondent Davies'
performance4 did not breach a duty to Appellant because that position was based on the factual
premise that Responde nt Davies did everything Appellant asked him to do. That factual premise
is false. Responde nts' own pleadings acknowledge that the premise is false. 5
For example, the record is abounding with testimony from Appellant that the sale price of
his business, F.E.M., was $2M, yet Respondent Davies submitted an affidavit in the underlying
case that stated "F .E.M.' s total compensation for the sale of its assets as part of the sale was a

3

Respondents admit that Judge Barton did not issue his ruling on the issue of breach of duty. See Responden
t' s
Brief, p. 6.; "district court properly determined that Ciccarello was required to have expert testimony on
the
elements of breach and causation", Respondents' Brief, p. 7; "Judge Barton was concerned that there was
no expert
testimony to support the elements of duty, breach and causation", Id. p. 9
4
Whether Davies performance met or fell below the applicable standard of care doesn' t become an issue
given that
"the performance" can only be measured on the facts asserted, which in this case were false.
5
" ...the alleged malpractice occurred, and Ciccarello was allegedly
damaged, by the drafting of the various
documents in June 2013." R., Vol I, page 000192. " Even if Davies did, in fact, "self-deal" against the
interests of
Plaintiff Ciccarello by way of a conflict of interest, any self-dealing occurred in June 2013." Id. "If Davies
was
negligent in drafting the Asset Purchase Agreement, as Plaintiff Ciccarello argues, it was in the drafting
of the Asset
Purchase Agreement, by way of merger clause, to reflect that $50,000 was the entire consideration paid
for the
assets of F.E.M ... there is certainly a difference between $2,000,000 cash, as expected, and a $50,000 promissory
note ... " R, Vol. I, p. 000194.
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promissory note from Lotus in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000).6 R., Vol. I, p.
00203.
Respondent Davies' argument asserted in the reply on his first motion for summary
judgemen t also confirms he breached a duty to Appellant:
... taking all of Plaintiff Ciccarello' s allegations as true: ( 1) the merger clauses of the
Asset Purchase Agreement and Independent Contractor Agreement worked, upon execution, to
deprive Ciccarello of both $1,950,000 and any ownership interest in Baus; (2) the Independent
Contractor Agreement bound Ciccarello to a sixteen year obligation and follow-on
·
noncompetition agreement, without Ciccarello receiving the benefit of his bargain at the outset;
and (3) the organizational documents of Baus and Lotus stripped Ciccarello of ownership
interests Ciccarello is alleged to have enjoyed. In sum, even if all of Plaintiff Ciccarell o's
allegations are true, Ciccarello would have suffered some legally cognizable damage at the
execution of each of the documents complained of."
R., Vol. 1, p. 433.
These statements from Respondent Davies' alone should have precluded summary
judgment. It is simply unbelievable that Respondents could argue in their first motion for
summary judgmen t that Respondents didn't represent Appellant, which lack ofreprese ntation
was clear given that all documents were drafted against Appellan t's interests and in favor of
Lotus, and in their next motion, argue that Respondents did exactly, and everything Appellant
asked (and on that basis assert no breach of duty). It is equally unbelievable how the District
Court could ignore the false premise on which Respondents' motions for summary judgmen t
were based; such discounting of the record in the case was an abuse of discretion by the District
Court.
Respondents' breach of duty to Appellant is not limited to the drafting of the subject sale
documents. Appellant testified in the underlying case "Mr. Davies had repeatedly told me the
documents related to the sale of F.E.M., including the Independent Contractor Agreement, would

6

Mr. Davies acknowled ged in his deposition that Appellant's asking price for F.E.M. was $2M. R., 000303.

APPELL ANT'S REPLY BRIEF

9

be redrafted after my criminal matters were cleared to protect my interests. Again, he was
always acting on my behalf and never indicated to me that he was acting on behalf of anyone
else or not in fact my attorney." R. , Vol. 1, p. 000311.
The record also contains the following statement, which can only be dispositive in
response to Respondents ' respective motions for summary judgment at issue; by Respondent
Davies: "Tellingly, the Independent Contractor Agreement contained a provision that ceased
compensation to Plaintiff Ciccarello should Ciccarello become incarcerated, at the time a very
real - and later, fulfilled - risk to Ciccarello; this provision inured directly to Lotus' benefit,
as befits an agreement drafted by Lotus' attorney, Davies, and negotiated against Plaintiff
Ciccarello, a then-unrepresented counterparty." R., Vol. l, p. 000402 (emphasis added).

" ... that Plaintiff Ciccarello comes now alleging that Davies represented him personally- rather
than, as was the case, Lotus - strains credulity and could not be reasonably construed as Davies
having implicitly agreed to provide legal assistance to Ciccarello." R., Vol. 1, p. 000403
(emphasis added). 7
Are we simply to ignore the record? Or assume for the sake of the motion that the factual
premise on which Respondents' argument was based is true, notwithstanding it is contradicted
throughout the record both by the Respondents and by Appellant? Of course not.
The well-established standard is, "if reasonable people could reach different conclusions
or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied." Pike v.

Thompson, 125 Idaho 897, 900, 876 P.2d 595, 598 (1994).

7

"Ciccare llo lost the benefit of his bargain and incurred binding legal obligations (foreclosin g other remunerati
ve
employmen t in the vaping industry) at two moments in June 20 13 when the separate Asset Purchase
Agreement and
Independent Contractor Agreement were executed." R., Vol. I, p. 000438 (Responde nt Davies Reply
Brief). That is
when he was damaged by Respondent Davies.

APPELL ANT'S REPLY BRIEF

10

The District Court abused its discretion in granting Respondents' motions for summary
judgment, as Appellant established substantial issues of disputed material facts on the issue of
breach of duty and the District Court should have denied the motions.
3. Defendants' argument that without first establishing a prima facie case via
expert testimony, there can be no genuine dispute of fact, is without merit.

In their respective briefing, Respondents appear to take the position that only an expert
affidavit can create issues of fact to withstand a motion for summary judgment. As touched on
above, Respondents misconstrue the applicable law on this issue.
"The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, and then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact." Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125
Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (1994)(emphasis added).
Appellant acknowledges that case law also supports the proposition that "[w]hen the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proving an element at trial, the moving party may establish
a lack of genuine issue of material fact by establishing the lack of evidence supporting an
element. Id. (a moving party' s burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an
element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial); see also Garzee v. Barkley
121 ldaho 771,828 P.2d 334 (1992)(summary judgment facilitates dismissal of/actually
unsupported claims prior to trial; where the acts complained of, accepted as true, don't give rise
to a claim).
Appellant has established facts sufficient to support his claim. However, the
Respondents did not establish a lack of genuine issue of material fact by establishing a lack of
evidence on an element; that element being breach of duty. Rather, Respondents simply chose to
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ignore their "no genuine issue of material fact" burden, and instead took the blanket position
that Appellant needed an expert to establish the prima facia elements of his malpractice claim.
Responden ts took this position even though the facts on which their argument premised, are
false.
If Respondents would have simply argued how Responden t Davies actions didn' t breach

a duty to Appellant such as in the Greenfield case, Appellant would have submitted an expert
affidavit that set forth the reasons why Respondent Davies did breach the applicable standard of
care. But in this case, Responden ts premised their motion on a discrete statement offact ... that
Appellant can't claim a breach of duty because Respondent Davies did exactly what Appellant
asked him to do. The only response to Respondents' motions, as couched, was to challenge the
factual premise on which it was based. By establishing that the factual premise was false, or by
establishing genuine issues of material fact as to whether Respondent Davies did exactly what
Appellant requested, the motion had to be denied.
Put another way, if Responden ts would not have so specifically "factually qualified" their
motions in the manner that they did, Appellant would have come forward with an expert
affidavit. Because Respondents did specifically "factually qualify" their motions, and because
Appellant established that the factual premise was false and/or disputed, the motions for
summary judgments should have been denied without more.
4. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering Plaintiffs Expert

Witness Disclosure, but did abuse its discretion on finding that the opinions
contained therein did not create an issue of fact to defeat summary judgment.
As set forth above, Appellant did not rely on an affidavit from his expert witness Mr.
Larsen, or cite the District Court to his Expert Witness Disclosure in responding to the subject
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motions for summary judgment. Citations to declarations and depositions made by Appellant in
opposition to Respondents' motions for summary judgment, overwhelmingly established several
issues of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment; i.e. that Respondents'
motions were based on a false factual premise.8
Notwithstanding this fact, the District Court looked to the Appellant's Expert Witness
Disclosure , in considering and ruling upon Respondents' motions.
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3), " [t]he Court need consider only cited
materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Former Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure also provided that in order to determine whether a judgment should be entered as a
matter of law, the trial court must review the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on
file most liberally construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Pike, supra, at 899, 876 P.2d at 597.
Appellant's Expert Witness Disclosure was a pleading in the record of the underlying
case. Thus the District Court appreciated that it had the discretion to consider other materials in
the record, namely the Expert Witness Disclosure, and did take the contents of that under
consideration.
However, the District Court abused its discretion by discounting its contents and finding
that the disclosure did not create an issue of material fact to defeat Responden ts' motions for
summary judgment.9
Appellant's Expert Witness Disclosure outlines in detail the duties that Respondent
Davies owed to Appellant and that Respondent Davies breached his duty to Appellant,

8

Appellant did not file a motion for extension of time under IRCP 56(d), on this same basis; such a motion was not
necessary given the nature of Respondents ' motions.
9
Again, Respondents' motions were based on the discrete fact premise that Appellant can' t claim Respondents
breached a duty to him because Respondent Davies did exactly what Appellant asked him to do.
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specifically (1) Respondent Davies failure to obtain written consent from Appellant prior to
representing Lotus (a party whose interests are materially adverse to Appellant) was a breach of
his duty to Appellant and/or the applicable standard of care; and (2) Respondent Davies in
drafting the subject sale documents to allow Lotus (an entity in which he has an ownership
interest in) to stop making purchase payments to Appellant in the event he became incarcerated
(which appeared inevitable at the time of sale) and to allow Lotus to terminate the agreement and
discontinue paying Appellant the purchase price of F .E.M. at any time, also breached his duty to
Appellant and/or the applicable standard of care. Mr. Larsen' s opinions were not conclusory or
speculative. That certain actions, or breaches of duty, taken by Respondents caused Appellant
damages is exactly the type of testimony that would assist the trier of fact. Nor are Mr. Larsen's
opinions inadmissible because he relies on applicable rules of professional conduct to support his
claims that Respondents breached the applicable standard of care.
Instead of focusing on the "breach of duty" aspects of Appellant's Expert Witness
Disclosure - which was the only prima facie element raised by Respondents' in their motions for
summary judgement - the District Court instead contrived a new "element" in which it believed
Appellant's expert witness should speak to; that a non-negligent attorney could have got
Appellant better deal terms.
Upon a cursory review of the disclosure, it obvious that Mr. Larsen's opinion was that
"better deal terms" clearly included no non-payment provision while Appellant was incarcerated,
no provision wherein Lotus had the right to terminate the Asset Purchase Agreement and stop
making payments to Appellant for its purchase of F.E.M. This new element applied by the
District Court goes to the issue of causation and damages, which were not raised in Respondents'
motions.
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The District Court's creation of this new element and its apparent refusal to limit its
review to arguments raised by the Respondents constitutes an abuse of discretion and warrants
reversal.
5. The District Court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the declarations
of Appellant's expert Mr. Larsen, on Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration.
As set forth in Appellan t's opening brief, instead of considering the Declarations of Mr.
Larsen relied upon by Appellant in his Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court held that
the Appellant should have filed a motion for additional time under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
56(d). R., Vol. I, p. 000809.
" When this Court reviews the denial of a motion for reconsideration following the grant
of summary judgmen t, 'this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine
issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment." Fragnella v. Petrovich , 153 Idaho 266, 276,
281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
The case of Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161 , 158 P.3d 937 (2007), is directly on point
and renders Respondents' arguments frivolous.
Puckett filed an expert disclosure in which the she failed to list a physician expert
familiar with the local standard of care. Dr. Verska moved to strike the disclosure, and the
following day moved for summary judgmen t on the basis that Puckett could not produce
testimony about the local standard of care. Puckett filed a supplemental expert witness
disclosure, which was also deficient. Puckett then filed an affidavit of her expert who testified
that he had familiarized himself with a local orthopedic surgeon. However, because the
physician with whom the expert familiarized himself was on Puckett' s pre-litigation screening
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panel, the court stick the affidavit and granted Dr. Verska' s motion for summary judgment . Id.
at 165, 158 P.3d 941.
Thereafter Puckett filed a motion for reconsideration, providing another affidavit from
her expert in which he testified he had properly familiarized himself with the applicable local
standard of care. Id. The district court granted the motion for reconsideration because the expert
was "now familiar with the applicable standard of care and was qualified to testify. Thus,
summary judgmen t was inappropriate because a material fact was in dispute whether [Dr.]
Verska met the applicable standard of care" and the case proceeded to trial.
Dr. Verska appealed, contending that the district court erred in granting Puckett's motion
for reconsideration by considering the expert affidavit filed in support of that motion, in granting
the motion for reconsideration; that the district court can only rely on affidavits "timely" filed
before the summary judgmen t hearing, not those filed afterwards. Id. at 166, 158 P.3d 941.
This Court held that "until the final judgmen t has been entered, an order granting
summary judgmen t is an interlocutory order and subject to reconsideration pursuant to I.R.C.P.
1 l(a)(2)(B )." Id. 10 This Court went on to hold that "when reviewing a motion for
reconsideration, the district court 'should take into account any new facts presented by the
moving party that bear on the correctness of the interlocutory order." Id. (citations in the Verska
opinion omitted), see also Taylor v. Riley, 162 Idaho 692,403 P.3d 636 (2017)(court must
entertain motion for reconsideration of interlocutory order if timely filed), citing Wicke! v.

Chamberlin, 159 Idaho 532, 363 P.3d 854 (2015).

10
This Court held Dr. Verska's reliance on Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 957 n. 2, 842 P.2d 288, 293
n. 2 (Ct.
App. 1992) for the proposition that the district court may not consider affidavits submitted after a summary
judgment, was misplaced, as the Court of Appeals in that case had erroneously found the order granting
summary
judgment as a final order and not an interlocutory order, in holding that a party cannot rely on post-hearin
g affidavits
in a motion for summary judgment. Respondents' reliance on Jarman v. Hale is without merit, as its
holding was
been effectively overturned in Verska.
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In Wicke/, plaintiffs expert was unable to fami liarize himself with the standard of care in
Idaho Falls, so he familiarized himself with the standard of care in Twin Falls. The district court
held that the expert did not establish that Twin Falls and Idaho Falls were similar communities,
and granted Dr. Chamberla in's motion for summary judgment. Wickel filed a motion for
reconsideration supported by a second affidavit of his expert which contained testimony that he
had confirmed that Twin Falls and Idaho Falls were similar communities and shared an
applicable standard of care. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration on the basis
that there were not sufficient facts in the record at the time of summary judgment for the court to
determine they were similar communities.
Thereafter, the district court entered a document titled "final judgment" dismissing
Wickel's claims. Wicke! timely appealed to this Court, and on October 28, 2013, this Court
remanded the matter to the district court as the final judgment was not a final judgment as
defined by I.R.C.P. 54(a). Id. at 535, 363 P.3d at 857. On October 30, 2013 Wickel filed a
second motion for reconsideration asking the district court to reconsider it finding that there was
insufficient evidence that Twin Falls and Idaho Falls are similar communities within the meaning
ofl.C. § 6-102. Wicke! supported the motion with a second supplemental affidavit from his
expert, which Dr. Chamberlin moved to strike. The next day the district court filed a final
judgment that complied with I.R.C.P. 54(a). Following a hearing on the motion for
reconsideration, the district court held it did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion because
it was filed more than 14 days after the original (deficient) final judgment was entered. Id.
This Court held that the district court erred in holding that it did not have jurisdiction to
consider the second motion for reconsideration, as the final judgment (compliant with I.R.C.P.
54(a)) had not been entered; the district court should have entertained the merits of Wickel's
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motion. Id. at 538, 363 P.3d 860. "On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any
new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of the interlocutory order." Id.,
quoting Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). This Court
vacated the district court's order denying Wickel's second motion for reconsideration and
remanded the case for a determination of the admissibility of the expert affidavit before
consideration of the merits of that motion for reconsideration. Id.
Similar to these cases, the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to consider
Appellant's motion for summary judgment, including the declarations of Mr. Larsen in support
of Appellant's motion.
6. Respondents should not be awarded attorney fees or costs.
Respondents have always denied that there was an attorney client relationship between
Respondents and Appellant during the time period relevant to this litigation. In doing so,
Respondents effectively must take the positions there was no "commercial transaction" between
Respondents and Appellant; Respondents have waived any argument that a transaction existed
and/or cannot now use their claimed "lack of a transaction" as a basis for a fee award.
This Court in Reynolds v. Trout Jones, 154 Idaho 2 1, 293 P.3d 645 (2013), held "the
prevailing party may be entitled to attorney fees under §12- 120(3) in an action for legal
malpractice so long as a commercial transaction occurred between the prevailing party and

the party from whom that party seeks fees." Id. at 27,293 P.3d at 651 (emphasis added).
This Court went on to say that as long as the commercial transaction (i.e. that transaction

between the prevailing party and the party from whom that party seeks fees) is at the center of
the lawsuit, the prevailing party may be entitled to attorney fees for claims that are
fundamentally related to the commercial transaction yet sound in tort. Id., see also Soignier v.
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Fletcher, wherein this Court held that the transaction between the attorney and client was
commercial, but that the transaction between the attorney and will-beneficiary was not, i.e. akin
to no privity of contract. 151 Idaho 322,326, 256 P.3d 730, 734(2011). Put another way, the
transaction between the attorney and client was not personal or household purposes, it was a
commercial relationship or transaction between the party and the attorney, which in this case
Respondents deny existed.
It is Appellant's position that at issue is the relationship (i.e. commercial transaction)

between the plaintiff and the defendant attorney - not the nature of the cause of action in which
the defendant attorney represented the plaintiff. To hold otherwise would say that plaintiffs that
sued their attorney for malpractice in a personal injury case were entitled to an award of fees, but
plaintiffs who sued their attorney for a botched commercial contract could not. Such an outcome
is clearly not equitable. Here, Respondents chose early in the litigation to take the position there
was no relationship, no commercial transaction, between Appellant and Respondents.
Appellant requests this Court deny Respondents any award of attorney fees and costs
pursuant to J.C. §12-120(3).
Dated this 9th day of April, 2019
POINTS LAW, PLLC

By: Michelle R. Points
Michelle R. Points
Attorney for Appellant
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